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Introduction
This paper investigates the economic consequences of a di¤erence in the planning horizon between an institutional investor pursuing long-term investment strategies and a regulator enforcing prudential standards and practices on a short-term basis. Such a misalignment of horizons between an institutional investor and a regulator are likely to exist in most developed …nancial markets and a¤ect, for example, banks, insurance companies, and, notably, pension funds.
Consider the case of a bank operating under the Basel Accords. Under Basel II a bank will be required to hold credit risk capital determined by 1-year default probabilities and expected shortfalls. The regulatory horizon is likely to stand in sharp contrast with the horizon of long-term investment projects involving payo¤s in a more distant future a bank has to evaluate with respect to his creditworthiness.
A second case is a pension fund, which faces long-term pension liabilities with typical maturities of 15 years or more under a regulatory framework which imposes short-term solvency constraints. In 2002, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) launched the Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS). Using this system, APRA …rst estimates each pension fund's probability that the institution may be unable to honor its …nancial promises to its members and then assigns supervisory stance accordingly. A more recent example can be observed in the Netherlands where a pension regulatory regime (Financieel Toetsings Kader, FTK) is e¤ective as of January 2007. According to the Dutch regulation, pension funds should always keep the probability of underfunding one year ahead below 2.5%. Underfunding refers to the situation where the market value of a pension fund's assets falls below the market value of the pension fund's liabilities.
The existence of such funding constraints can be understood in light of the recent experience of a simultaneous decrease in pension assets due to a poor stock market performance and an increase in pension liabilities due to low interest rates. For the UK, KPMG estimated the aggregate funding de…cit of the FTSE-100 companies reaches GBP 40 billion at the end of 2008. De Nederlandsche Bank reports that the average Dutch pension funding ratio dropped from 144% in 2007 to 99% in the third quarter of 2010. Of all Dutch pension funds, around 68% has a funding ratio below 105%. The situation in the US is equally alarming. The funding de…cit in America's corporate pension funds is estimated to be 350bn USD (Jørgensen 2007) .
The examples above demonstrate the particular importance of VaR constraints in regulatory practice despite the theoretical shortcomings of this risk measure (see Artzner Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation et al.1999) . For this reason, we focus on VaR-type regulation. This paper provides an analytical tool to assess the costs and bene…ts of a VaR-type regulation when the regulatory horizon is as long as the investment horizon and when the regulatory horizon is shorter than the investment horizon. In the latter case, within the investor's investment horizon, there are a number of subsequent and non-overlapping regulatory checks and the investment horizon is divided into a few equal-length sub-periods. In general, the investor has to insure his portfolio against the bad performance of the …nancial market to guarantee that (1) the current period VaR constraint is met and (2) there is enough wealth to ful…ll the next periods VaR constraints. To do so, the investor has to hold more risk-free assets and less risky assets, thus, his ability to pro…t from the favorable …nancial market performance is limited. The economic bene…ts and costs are measured by the reduction in the expected portfolio wealth shortfall and the equivalent amount of wealth lost due to the VaR regulation respectively. We show that a short regulatory horizon can prevent portfolio wealth loss very e¤ectively but at the same time also introduces a large opportunity cost by limiting the investor's ability to invest in risky assets and pro…t from the favorable stock market performance.
The strategic asset allocation problem has been studied extensively. For example, Kim and Omberg (1996) and Wachter (2002) study the optimal portfolio allocation where the price of risk is mean-reverting. Bajeux-Besnainou, Jordan and Portait (2003) and Sorensen (1999) solve the optimal investment problem when interest rates are stochastic. This paper is related to the literature studying the optimal portfolio trading strategy under constraints. Grossman and Vila (1992) provide explicit solutions to optimal portfolio problems containing leverage and minimum portfolio return constraints. Basak (1995) and Grossman and Zhou (1995) focus on the impact of a speci…c VaR constraint, the portfolio insurance 1 , on asset price dynamics in a general equilibrium model. Van Binsbergen and Brandt (2006) assess the in ‡uence of ex ante (preventive) and ex post (punitive) risk constraints on dynamic portfolio trading strategies. Ex ante risk constraints include, among others, VaR and short sell constraints. Ex post risk constraints include the loss of the investment manager's personal compensation and reputation when the portfolio wealth turns out to be low. They found that ex ante risk constraints tend to decrease gain from dynamic investment while ex post risk constraints can be welfare improving. Basak and Shapiro (2001) discuss the impact of the VaR type regulation on the institutional investors'portfolio wealth and trading strategies. Their results show that a VaR constraint keeps the portfolio value above or at the threshold value, e.g. the value of a pension fund's liability, when the investment environment (states of the world) is favorable but generate a loss in unfavorable states of the world. The favorable (unfavorable) states are the ones in which it is cheap (expensive) for the investor to raise his portfolio wealth to the level of the threshold value. Ironically, the loss under a VaR constraint is even larger than the one without a VaR constraint in those unfavorable states. The unfavorable states of world occur with probability : This probability is set by the regulator. The explanation is as follows. The VaR constrained investor is only concerned about the probability but neither the magnitude of the loss, nor in which (cheap or expensive) states this loss occurs. Therefore, it is optimal for him to incur losses in unfavorable states where it is most expensive to raise his portfolio wealth.
In Basak and Shapiro (2001) , the VaR horizon is as long as the investment horizon and interest rates are deterministic. We extend the Basak and Shapiro (2001) paper by (1) embedding a number of subsequent and non-overlapping short-term VaR type regulations in the portfolio optimization problem and (2) allowing for a stochastic interest rate. We show that more frequent regulation can prevent the investor from generating a loss in unfavorable states due to the fact that there is a minimum amount of portfolio wealth required to ful…ll future VaR constraints.
We also analyzed the portfolio choices of three types of investors, namely, an investor facing a number of short-term VaR constraints during his investment horizon (the multiVaR investor), an investor facing one long-term VaR constraint during his investment horizon (the one-VaR investor), and an unconstrained investor (the benchmark investor). We …nd that the portfolio choice of the multi-VaR investor di¤ers considerably from the one of the one-VaR investor and the benchmark investor. The deviation is most profound in the "transitional" states where there is a highest uncertainty regarding whether the future investment environment will turn out to be favorable or not. The one-VaR investor will have a large demand for risky assets and a low demand for riskless assets to …nance a large portfolio wealth if the …nancial market turns out to be favorable, and generate a large amount of loss otherwise. The multi-VaR investor has a much smaller demand for risky assets and a much larger demand for riskless assets to compensate for the loss the risky assets might generate if the …nancial market turns out to be unfavorable and thus, guarantees that his portfolio wealth is su¢ cient to ful…ll future VaR constraints in all circumstances.
Finally, we …nd that both the size and the probability of having a high or a low portfolio wealth level decrease as the regulatory frequency increases. More frequent VaR constraints does seem to be e¤ective in reducing the size and the likelihood of a portfolio Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation wealth loss but at the cost of losing the ability to bene…t from the booming …nancial market. Cuoco et al. (2008) considers the optimal trading strategy of institutional investors under short-horizon VaR constraints assuming that the portfolio allocation over the VaR horizon is constant and the interest rate is deterministic. We extend Cuoco et al. (2008) by allowing for optimal and time-varying portfolio allocations over the VaR horizon and having a stochastic interest rate. This enables us to quantify the costs and bene…ts of a VaR regulation given that the institutional investor behaves optimally and study the hedge behavior of the investor under short-horizon VaR constraints. This paper is also related to the literature about dynamic trading strategies of pension funds. Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) considers an optimal asset allocation with a power utility function in …nal surplus. Boulier et al. (2005) assume a constant investment opportunity set with a risky and a risk-free asset. In their paper, the pension plan sponsor aims to minimize the expected discounted value of future contributions over a given horizon. Inkmann and Blake (2008) proposes a new approach to the valuation of pension obligations taking into account the asset allocation strategy and the underfunding risk of a pension fund. This paper focuses on the optimal portfolio wealth of a pension fund when the regulatory horizon is shorter than its investment horizon and evaluates the economic costs and bene…ts of such a regulation. Advantages of having frequent shortterm VaR constraints include, among others, smaller expected portfolio wealth losses.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the investment environment. Section 3 studies the optimal portfolio wealth and trading strategies under VaR constraints and Section 4 discusses the economic costs and bene…ts of imposing short-term value-at-risk type of regulation. Section 5 concludes.
The Investment Environment
We consider a continuous-time stochastic economy on a …nite horizon [0; T ] in a complete …nancial market: There are four assets in the market, namely, a zero-coupon bond maturing at time T, a cash account, a stock index and a constant maturity zero-coupon bond fund. The stock index (with dividend reinvested) is assumed to follow,
where r t is the short-term interest rate, S is the stock risk premium, S is the instantaneous stock price volatility and Z S;t is a standard Brownian motion. The short-term Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation interest rate r t follows a Vasicek process,
where determines the mean-reverting speed of the interest rate, r is the long-term interest rate, and r is the instantaneous volatility of the interest rate. Z r;t is a standard Brownian motion. The two Brownian motions, Z r;t and Z S;t ; are correlated with correlation coe¢ cient sr : Vasicek (1977) derived the price of a zero-coupon bond at time t with T t years to maturity and a face value of $1, P
where
; r describes the interest rate risk premium; and R 1 describes the yield to maturity for a very long time-to-maturity bond (i.e., T t approaches to in…nity). The duration of this bond D t is de…ned as the elasticity of the bond price with respect to the short-term interest rate, i.e.;
For this zero coupon bond, the duration is described by B (T t) : Using the Ito-Doeblin Lemma, the dynamics of the zero-coupon bond prices are given by
where the price of the bond risk, P ; is r = r , and the standard deviation of the bond
Following (4), the price dynamics of a bond fund with M -year constant time to ma-Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation
All our bonds are not defautable.
Since the market is dynamically complete, there exists one unique pricing kernel. Let t describe the di¤usion process of the pricing kernel, : Merton (1992) shows that the pricing kernel can be constructed as the inverse of the growth-optimum portfolio. Please See Appendix A for the derivation and the veri…cation of t :
Optimal Portfolio Wealth and Trading Strategies
We consider the problem of an institutional investor who starts with an endowment W 0 and must select a portfolio 2 so as to maximize the expected utility E[u(W T )] of the terminal value of the trading portfolio. Assume that the institutional investor has a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter .
The regulator imposes a VaR constraint on the institutional investor: the probability that the portfolio wealth at time t + falls below W should not be larger than , where is usually a small number in the interval [0; 1]. The VaR constraint can be formulated as
where ; > 0; is the regulatory horizon, 2 [0; 1] and the " ‡oor" W is speci…ed exogenously. For a pension fund, the " ‡oor" is the value of its liability at time t + . In 2 In a stochastic interest rate investment environment, if the zero-coupon bond matures at time T is the only bond in the portfolio, this bond then has two tasks, which are (1) to achieve the optimal interest rate risk exposure for speculative purpose and (2) to hedge the interest rate risk as it is a risk-free asset over the investment horizon. To uncouple these two functions we introduce a bond fund with H-year constant time to maturity, P H t ; as in Bajeux-besnainou et al. (2003): Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation this paper, both and W are set by the regulator.
In the single-constraint model, the regulatory horizon is as long as the investment horizon . At time 0, the regulator requires that the probability the portfolio wealth at time T falls below W should be smaller than ; say 2:5%;
In the two-constraint and the more general multi-constraint models, the investment horizon stays the same but the regulatory horizons become shorter and shorter. In the twoconstraint model, the regulatory horizon equals half of the investment horizon, meaning that there are two subsequent and non-overlapping VaR constraints within the investment horizon, i.e.,
In the multi-constraint model, say m-constraint model, each VaR horizon is T =m and there are m non-overlapping and subsequent VaR constraints within the investment horizon.
Without Regulatory Constraints
When no VaR constraints are imposed, the investor's optimization problem is,
The solution to this problem is classical, but we provide a short recollection for expository reasons. Following the so-called Martingale method by Cox and Huang (1989) , the optimal portfolio wealth at time T without a VaR constraint, W u T ; is
where the Lagrangian multiplier y equates the budget constraint (8) stand for the percentages of portfolio wealth invested in the stock index, the bond fund and the zero-coupon bond at time t respectively. 1 
The optimal portfolio is a weighted average of two funds, a speculative fund (the second term on the right-hand side of (9)) and a hedge fund (the fourth term on the right-hand side of (9)). The portfolio strategy of the speculative fund depends on, among others, the risk premia of underlying assets. The portfolio strategy of the hedge fund is driven by the investor's desire to hedge interest rate risk. Therefore, the hedge fund consists only of the zero-coupon bond which matures at the end of the investment horizon. The portfolio weights assigned to these to funds are the relative risk tolerance 1= on the speculative fund and the complement 1 1= on the hedge fund. For an investor with a log utility ( = 1), the hedge term vanishes. For an investor who is extremely risk averse ( = 1), this investor will invest his entire wealth in the hedge fund. Provided that the risk premia, S and r , are constant, portfolio weights on these four assets are constant over time as in Bajeux-Besnainou, et. al. (2003) . Appendix B.1 provides a short derivation of (9).
The indirect utility of current wealth at time t, is the maximum expected utility conditional on the information available at time t. The maximum is obtained by the optimal wealth process. Without a VaR constraint, the indirect utility at time t takes the form,
(10) Sorensen (2001) argues that the indirect utility of current wealth can be interpreted as the expected utility of future wealth as if current wealth were invested in a zero-coupon bond which matures at time T without default risk (the …rst term in (10)) and adjusted with the term e 1 2 (
] is the inverse of the price of a zero-coupon bond with T t years to maturity and a face value of $1. The Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation adjustment term re ‡ects the investor's risk-return trade-o¤ from holding risky securities. The indirect utility at time t is increasing with both portfolio wealth at time t, W t , and the interest rate at time t, r t . A high (low) interest rate will result in a high (low) yield of the zero-coupon bond and, therefore, a high indirect utility. Appendix B.2 provides a short derivation of (10).
The Single-Constraint Model
In our single-constraint model, the VaR horizon is as long as the investment horizon, the investor's optimization problem is
subject to
The problem (11) can be re-stated as
where "I" is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if W T W holds, the Lagrangian multipliers y c1 and y c1 2 solve (12) and (13) respectively. The subscript c1 stands for one VaR constraint. Since the last two terms of (14) are constants, the optimal wealth in the single constraint model W c1 T is the wealth which maximizes the function value within E 0 [ ] in (14).
Following Basak and Shapiro (2001) , the optimal portfolio wealth is built pointwise on the realized value of the pricing kernel at time T ( T ): The pricing kernel, T ; takes di¤erent values in di¤erent states of the world at time T. We use ! to indicate the states of the world, where ! 2 ; and refers to the sample space. For each given value of T;! ; ! 2 ; the optimal portfolio wealth is the one which maximizes the value of L W T ; T;! : Basak and Shapiro (2001)'s result can be directly applied here even though in our case interest rates are stochastic. The optimal portfolio wealth at time T when the VaR horizon is as long as the investment horizon is
T is de…ned by Pr 0 T c1 T which means that at time 0 the probability that T will be larger than T ("bad" states), the fund manager behaves again as if the VaR constraint is not imposed and incurs large losses. The probability that the investor will end up in the region where T c1 T is : Recall that the quantity T;! can be interpreted as the marginal cost at time 0 of obtaining one additional unit of wealth in state ! at time T. Thus, the investment environment worsens as the value of T increases. Under a VaR constraint, the investor is only concerned with the probability but not the magnitude of a loss, therefore, the investor chooses to raise the portfolio wealth to W in states when it is relatively cheap to do so. Thus, the wealth level in states where
is raised to W and there are large losses in the "bad" states where T c1 T since the probability of ending up in these states is and it is most expensive to raise the wealth level to W in these states. As a result, in the "bad" states, the institutional investor under a VaR constraint generates a larger loss than the one without a VaR constraint. Basak and Shapiro (2001) shows that W c1 T is equivalent to the sum of unconstrained portfolio wealth (y T holds and nothing otherwise. That is,
Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation The …rst term in (17) derives from the unconstrained portfolio wealth and the remaining terms re ‡ect the value of the "corridor" option at time t.
The percentages of wealth invested in the stock index, the bond fund and the bond are 
X c1 spec;t is the demand of the speculative fund relative to demand in the unconstrained model. And X c1 hedge;t is the demand to the hedge fund relative to demand in the unconstrained model. Appendix C provides the derivations of Figure 2: This …gure shows the optimal portfolio allocation at time t = T =2 in Panel A and optimal portfolio wealth at time t in Panel B with and without a VaR constraint. In this …gure, the interest rate at time t is …xed at 4%. In Panel A, the red solid line represents the portfolio weight allocated to the speculative fund relative to the unconstrained portfolio weight X c1 spec;t and the blue dashed line represents the portfolio weight allocated to the hedge fund relative to the unconstrained weight X Both the optimal portfolio allocation and portfolio wealth depend on the interest rate and the pricing kernel value at time T =2. Figure 2 shows the optimal portfolio allocation at time T =2 in the left panel (Panel A) and portfolio wealth at time T =2 in the right panel (Panel B) with and without a VaR constraint when the interest rate at time t is …xed at 4%. Figure 3 shows the portfolio choice at time t with di¤erent interest rates.
In Figure 2 Panel A, the red solid line represents the portfolio weight allocated to the speculative fund relative to the unconstrained portfolio weight X c1 spec;t and the blue dashed line represents the portfolio weight allocated to the hedge fund relative to the unconstrained portfolio weight X In the Panel A, as the investment environment becomes worse, the VaR investor allocates less (more) to the speculative (hedge) fund to ful…ll the VaR constraint at time T. As the investment environment deteriorates further but the chances of ending up in the "intermediate" states are still very high, the VaR investor starts to increase (decrease) allocation to the speculative (hedge) fund. At that time, the investor is gambling. If the …nancial market at time T ends up in "intermediate" states, he can …nance his portfolio wealth at W by holding more risky assets. If the …nancial market at time T ends up in "bad" states, his portfolio wealth will su¤er a loss which is larger than the one without a VaR constraint. The VaR constrained investor is only concerned about the probability but not the magnitude of the loss. Therefore, the investor is willing to incur losses in compliance with the VaR constraint. As the investment environment becomes even worse, the investor is sure that he will end up in the "bad" states at time T where the VaR constraint is not binding. Thus, he behaves as if the VaR constraint is not imposed. The investment behavior depicted in Panel A leads to a hump shaped portfolio wealth at time T =2 shown in Panel B.
In …gure 3 Panel A, the red (grey) solid line and the red dashed line represent the relative portfolio weights in the speculative fund (X c1 spec ) and the hedge fund (X c1 hedge ) respectively when r t = 10% (0%). In general, a higher interest rate is related to a higher yield on the default-risk-free zero-coupon bond P T t t which makes the VaR constraint easier to be ful…lled. Thus, a higher interest rate shifts the portfolio allocation curve rightward. For example, when the interest rate is 0 and the value of the pricing kernel is 1, the investor considers to increase his allocation to the risky assets to …nance his portfolio wealth at time T to the level of W : However, when the interest rate is 10% and the value of the pricing kernel is 1, the investor will not consider to increase his allocation to the risky assets since the high yield from the riskless bond is su¢ cient to …nance his 
Two-and Multi-Constraint Models
The optimal portfolio wealth under two VaR constraints, W c2 T ; solves the problem
Our model directly embeds two VaR type constraints. We are going to use the backward iterative solution procedure to solve (21). First, we solve the maximization problem in the second period, that is, [T =2; T ] : This second period problem is identical to the oneconstraint model. We assume that at time T =2, the investor starts with wealth W T 2 : Following the same solution method as the one in the one-constraint model, we …nd the optimal wealth at time T, W 
:
We discuss these two steps in more details. The maximization problem for the second period is
The optimal portfolio wealth at time T under two-VaR constraints is
where I denotes an indicator function, The indirect utility at time T/2, J c2
; takes the form
where The …rst two terms of (23) derive from the utility over …nal wealth in the "good" ( The indirect utility (23) depends on both the interest rate at time T =2 and the portfolio wealth at time T =2: Figure 4 shows the indirect function at time T/2 for r T =2 equals to 0%, 5% and 10% respectively. For small portfolio wealth, the indirect utility under a VaR constraint is smaller than the one without a VaR constraint. As the wealth increases, the two indirect utilities converge as the VaR constraint becomes less binding. For any given portfolio wealth at time T =2, the indirect utility
; rT 2 increases with the interest rate. This result is driven by two facts. First, a part of the indirect utility is expected utility over portfolio wealth in the "good" and "bad" states at time T. In these states, the investor under a VaR constraint behaves as if the VaR constraint has not been imposed. As discussed earlier, the indirect utility at time T =2 without a VaR constraint Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation is increasing with the interest rate at time T =2. Second, high interest rate is coupled with higher zero coupon bond yield which makes the VaR constraint easier to be ful…lled.
The optimal trading strategy in the period from time 0 to time T =2 is a solution to the problem
where W T
2
;min is the minimal portfolio wealth required to ful…ll the next period's VaR constraint. The maximization problem in the …rst-period has one extra constraint (26). The minimum wealth at time T which makes it possible to ful…ll the VaR constraint in (22) is
i.e., keeping the portfolio wealth at time T at the level of W in the "good" and "inter-Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation mediate" states and leaves the portfolio wealth at 0 in the "bad" states. Therefore, the minimum wealth at time T =2, W T 2 ;min ; equals
If the wealth at time T =2 is smaller than W T 2 ;min ; it is not possible to ful…ll the VaR constraint in the next period. The minimum wealth at time T =2 is negatively related to the interest rate at time T =2 since the higher the interest rate the easier it is to ful…ll the VaR constraint at time T.
The Lagrangian for the constrained optimization problem (24) is given by (21) is satis…ed and the the Lagrangian multiplier y c2 3 makes sure that the portfolio wealth at time T =2 is su¢ cient to ful…ll the VaR constraint next period. The last two terms of (27) are constants. Thus, …nding a W v2 T 2 which maximizes the value of (27) is equivalent to …nding a portfolio wealth which maximizes the value of the function within E 0 [ ] in (27).
Again following the martingale method, the optimal portfolio wealth at time T =2 can be found using a pointwise optimization. That is, for each pair of interest rate at time T =2 and the pricing kernel value at time T =2, the optimal portfolio wealth is the one which maximizes the function L r T , the optimal portfolio wealth under two VaR constraints in "bad" states are much larger than both the one under one-VaR constraint and the one without any VaR constraints. However, in "good" states the portfolio wealth under two VaR constraints is much smaller than both the one under one VaR constraint and the one without any VaR constraints.
From Panel B, we can conclude (1) in "good" states, the optimal portfolio wealth decreases as interest rates increase, (2) the minimum wealth at time T =2 (W T 2 ;min ) decreases as the interest rate increases since a high interest rate leads to a high zero-coupon bond yield and thus reduces the minimum amount of wealth necessary to ful…ll the next period's VaR constraint, and (3) the states in which the investor keeps his portfolio wealth at W no longer depend only on the pricing kernel values. For example, in Panel B, the investor choose to keep his portfolio wealth at W in the state where t = 1 and r t = 0% while leave the portfolio wealth at W T 2 ;min in the state where t = 2 and r t = 10% even though 1 is larger than
and 2 is smaller than
The investor decides in which states he keeps his portfolio wealth at W not only on the value of the pricing kernel but also on the interest rates. For each state at time t; t 2 [0; T ] ; the cost of raising the portfolio wealth from the unconstrained portfolio wealth W u t to W equals t (W W u t ) : At time T, as shown in Figure 1 , the unconstrained portfolio wealth W u T monotonically decreases as T increases: Therefore, at time T, it is always cheaper to raise the wealth level to W in states where T < c2 T : While at time T =2, the unconstraint portfolio wealth depends on both the pricing kernel value and the interest rate. For any given value of T 2 ; the unconstrained portfolio wealth W ; and high interest rates. Figure 5 shows that two subsequent and non-overlapping VaR constraints can reduce the portfolio wealth loss at time T =2 very e¤ectively but at the cost of lowering the portfolio wealth when the …nancial market is booming. Since the institutional investor is interested in the …nal portfolio wealth, Figure 6 depicts the probability density functions of portfolio wealth at time T under one VaR constraint (W T ; there is a probability mass build-up at the wealth level W . The probability mass for W c2 T is much larger than the one for W c1 T : Both probability distribution exhibit a discontinuity. For the two-constraint model, no wealth falls between W and W T 2 ;min at time T/2 as shown in Figure 6 . For the one-constraint model, there is 4 The …nal wealth under two VaR constraints are estimated as follows. First, we estimated the indirect utility at time T =2. Second, we estimated the optimal portfolio wealth W is related to the interest rate at time T =2 and the pricing kernel value at time T =2: We simulated 2500 scenarios of r T =2 and T =2 : Third, we estimated the optimal portfolio wealth at time T for each simulated scenario at time T =2:
Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation no wealth falls between W and y c1 0 c1 T 1 at time T as shown in Figure 6 . The probability mass build-up for large wealth is smaller as the regulatory frequency increases. However, the probability mass build-up for small wealth is also smaller as the regulatory frequency increases, meaning both the size and the probability of portfolio wealth loss decreases as the regulatory frequency increases. Overall, more frequent VaR constraints does seem to be e¤ective in reducing portfolio wealth loss but at the cost of losing the ability to gain wealth when the …nancial market is booming. ; the portfolio wealth is
and the optimal portfolio allocation is 2 6 6 6 4 c2 s;t c2 
spec is the demand of the speculative fund relative to demand in the unconstrained model, and X c1 hedge is the demand to the hedge fund relative to demand in the unconstrained model. The …rst order derivatives are approximated as follows, Figure 7 shows portfolio weights in two-constraint and single-constraint models relative to the one in the unconstrained model at time T =3 when the interest rate r T =3 is 4%. When the …nancial market performs extremely well, both the investor under two VaR constraints and the investor under one VaR constraint behaves as if no VaR constraints have been imposed. As the market deteriorates, both investors increase their holdings in the hedge fund and decrease their holdings in the speculative fund. As the …nancial market deteriorates further, both investors increase their holding in the speculative fund. At that time, even though the …nancial market does not perform well but it is still very likely that the investors might end up in the "bad" states at time T and T/2. Therefore, both investors are gambling. At the same time, however, unlike the investor under one VaR constraint who decreases his holdings in the hedge fund, the investor under two VaR constraints increases his holdings in the hedge fund to compensate for the possible loss generated by the speculative fund. By doing so, the investor under two VaR constraints guarantees that his portfolio wealth is large enough to ful…ll next period's VaR constraint in all circumstances. As the …nancial market deteriorates still further, the investor under two VaR constraints decreases his holdings in the speculative fund to keep his portfolio wealth at W T 2 ;min at time T =2: At the same time, he decreases his holdings in the hedge fund since it is no longer necessary to invest in the hedge fund to compensate for the possible loss generated by the speculative fund. But his holdings in the hedge fund remains at a very high level to keep the portfolio wealth at time T =2 large enough to ful…ll next period's VaR constraint:
The analysis above can easily be extended to more than three constraints. For example, if there are m subsequent and non-overlapping VaR constraints within the investment horizon, we start by solving the optimal portfolio wealth in the last period and then proceed backwards by repeating the numerical procedures developed for …nding the …rst period's optimal portfolio wealth in the two-constraint model.
Bene…t and Cost Analysis
In this section, we consider a pension fund with 15-year investment horizon as an example to analyze the cost and the bene…t of VaR-type prudential regulation. The regulatory horizon considered here is 1 year, meaning that in the 15-year investment horizion, there are 15 non-overlapping VaR constraints.
The economic cost is measured by the certainty equivalent loss ce relative to the unconstrained portfolio allocation problem. The certainty equivalent loss ce is de…ned as Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation the equivalent amount of wealth lost due to the VaR regulation, i.e., We assume that = 1:5%, r = 5%; r = 1:5%; P = 5%; M = 10 years, S = 25%; sr = 20%; W = 1:05; r 0 = 2%; and the stock Sharpe ratio s = 25%: These set of parameters are close to those obtained by empirical studies, for example, Chan et al. (1992) . In particular, sr is chosen to be positive so that the correlation between interest rate and stock price is negative which is suggested by Campbell (1987) . For a pension fund, the natural choice of the " ‡oor" W is its liability. In this paper, we assumed that the value of the pension fund's liability is constant over time but it can be easily extended to the case when the liability value is stochastic as long as the liability value is exogenously determined. Figure 8 shows the certainty equivalent loss and the expected portfolio wealth shortfall of a pension fund with = 2 and = 2:5%.
We …nd that the …fteen VaR constraints can signi…cantly reduce the portfolio wealth shortfall. It is almost guaranteed that at the end of the investment horizon the pension fund's portfolio wealth will be above W : For example, when the initial portfolio wealth is 1.1, which corresponds to a funding ratio of about 1:05; the expected shortfall is about 0.35% when no VaR constraints are imposed. The expected shortfall decreases to almost 0 as the regulatory frequency increases. However, the certainty equivalent loss is 4.3% when there are 15 VaR constraints and 0.05% when there are two VaR constraints. In this numerical example, the cost introduced by the 15 VaR constraints over weights the bene…t these VaR constraints bring.
Conclusions
The value-at-risk type constraint is often adopted by regulators to limit the portfolio risk of institutional investors. However, the regulatory horizon is usually much shorter than the institutional investors'investment horizon. We …nd, e.g, that constrained investor, as Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation expected, often invests more in the risk-free asset than unconstrained investors. However, unintendedly, constraints may under certain market conditions also lead to gambling behavior in order to be able to meet future regulatory constraints. Also shorter regulatory horizon, on the one hand, enables an institutional investor like a pension fund to avoid large losses when the investment environment worsens but, on the other hand, also limits the institutional investor's ability to bene…t from an increase in stock prices. percent of his wealth in the stock index, the zero coupon bond with T t years to maturity and the cash account respectively. Let W t be the portfolio wealth,
where Merton (1992) shows that the pricing kernel is the inverse of a growth-optimum portfolio. Under the following three assumptions, (1) the stochastic structure and the information ‡ow is represented by a probability space ( ; F; P ) where the …ltration F = (F t ), t 2 [0; T ], satis…es the usual conditions (see, for instance, Du¢ e (1992)), (2) markets are free of arbitrage, frictionless, and continuously open, and (3) the prices of the risky assets and the zero-coupon bond follow semi-martingales with …nite expectation and variance, the growth-optimum portfolio is the optimal portfolio with the objective of maximizing Economic Costs and Bene…ts of Imposing Short-Horizon Value-at-Risk Type Regulation E 0 log (W T ) and the pricing kernel is the inverse of the growth-optimum portfolio (see Bajeux-Besnainou and Portait 1998).
The growth-optimum portfolio is given by 
The pricing kernel, which is the inverse of the growth optimum portfolio, is If the pricing kernel derived in (37) is correct, we must have
where S t is a stock price. The di¤usion process of the stock price is described in (1). It can be veri…ed that the stock price is
Thus, 
Substituting (34) and (35) 
A.2 The Derivation of the Bond Price
The price of a bond that pays $1 at time T without a default risk is
Inserting (37) 
